NYCPHP Meetup

[Edward Potter]

May want to check in with these guys, Eric Raymond's group. VERY hardcore
hackers.  They only emerge like once a year at DEFCON or HOPE. And hack *&^%
like this 24/7 the rest of the time. May be interested in what you are
doing. Seems to be in the same space.

>>>
Welcome to NedaNet

This is the resource page for NedaNet, a network of hackers formed to
support the democratic revolution in Iran. Our mission is to help the
Iranian people by setting up networks of proxy severs, anonymizers, and any
other appropriate technologies that can enable them to communicate and
organize — a network beyond the censorship or control of the Iranian regime.

http://nedanet.org/
>>>

Besides encrypting, you want to be CONTINUOUSLY re-encrypting. Don't like it
get stale.



On Thu, May 6, 2010 at 11:36 AM, Anthony Papillion <papillion at gmail.com>wrote:

> Hello Everyone,
>
> As some of you may know, during last years Presidential protests in Iran, I
> developed a distributed, multi-level, Twitter proxy service called
> TweetFree. For the first time in almost a year, I'm revisiting the code in
> an effort to update it and make it more useful for people outside of Iran
> but still in oppressive cultures.
>
> The system has several components: a Windows Mobile, iPhone, Android, and
> Blackberry application that connects to a TweetFree Relay server, the
> TweetFree Relay Server itself, and the main TweetFree Network Servers.  How
> this all works together is unimportant so I won't bore you with the details.
>
> Now, the TweetFree Network Servers maintain a network block list. So every
> time the Relay Servers send a post, the Network Server checks to make sure
> the client that the relay is posting for isn't blocked from the network. If
> it is, it says no and the relay tells the client that it couldn't post its
> message.  The problem with this, of course, is that you might have thousands
> of Relay Servers hitting the Network Servers (as happened during the Iranian
> election) and each of those requests have to be processed. That puts a bit
> of a load on the server that I'd like to alleviate.
>
> So my thought is to maintain a blacklist of client keys on the Network
> Servers and have the Relay Servers download this list every few minutes.
> Then, clients could be blocked at the RELAY level instead of at the Network
> level and less load would be put on the Network Servers (of which there are
> only about 10).
>
> My problem is that I'm not sure how to protect this list. The list is a
> simple text file that contains client keys. No identifying information, but
> client keys nonetheless. If it's a .txt file then the contents are viewable
> publicly which *could* pose a security risk in highly volatile environments.
> If I name it with the .php extension, it's handled like a PHP file and,
> thus, the text in it can't be read.
>
> What is the best way to handle this? I need to protect the users privacy
> while still reducing network load.
>
> Any ideas?
>
> Thanks!
> Anthony Papillion
>
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